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With the ever-growing proliferation of hardware and software-based computer security 
exploits and the increasing power and prominence of distributed attacks, network and system 
administrators are often forced to make a difficult decision: expend tremendous resources on 
defense from sophisticated and continually evolving attacks from an increasingly dangerous 
Internet with varying levels of success; or expend fewer resources on defending against 
common attacks on “low hanging fruit,” hoping to avoid the less common but incredibly 
devastating zero-day worm or botnet attack. Home networks and small organizations are usually 
forced to choose the latter option and in so doing are left vulnerable to all but the simplest of 
attacks. While automated tools exist for sharing information about network-based attacks, this 
sharing is typically limited to administrators of large networks and dedicated security-conscious 
users, to the exclusion of smaller organizations and novice home users. In this thesis we propose 
a framework for a cooperative defense overlay network (CODON) in which participants with 
varying technical abilities and resources can contribute to the security and health of the internet 
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As the internet continues to scale with the increased availability of connectivity in 
historically less prosperous geographic regions and as everyday objects become network-aware 
to form the so-called “internet of things” [5], we believe cooperative defense models that 
encourage “good neighbor” information sharing will be crucial to improving the safety of the 
internet as a whole. While automated tools exist for sharing information about network-based 
attacks, this sharing is usually limited to administrators of large networks and dedicated 
security-conscious users, to the exclusion of smaller organizations and novice home users. In 
this thesis we propose a framework for a cooperative defense overlay network in which 
participants with varying technical abilities and resources, but particularly those with minimal 
technical ability, can contribute to the security and health of the internet via crowdsourced 
blacklist generation, peer-to-peer security information sharing, and the principle of collateral 
defense. 
In Chapter 2 we explore prevalent network-based distributed attacks against networked 
systems, current and proposed methods of defense against distributed attacks, and related 
work. We then illustrate the need for a cooperative and collaborative defense that extends 
beyond a small alliance of large and well-resourced organizations. In Chapter 3, we describe the 
architecture and functionality of our proposed cooperative defense overlay network (CODON) 
as well as anticipated barriers to adoption and potential watershed moments that may spur 
adoption by large portions of the internet community. We conclude this thesis with a brief 
discussion of our conclusions and future work in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively.  
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2 Background and Related Work 
Before discussing the need for and value of implementing our proposed CODON 
framework, we will first examine various threats, both ubiquitous and less common, against 
which computer network and system administrators, referred to collectively in this thesis as 
“system administrators,” must defend in the course of maintaining the health and security of 
their various systems. We will also discuss relevant computer security concepts, best practices 
employed to defend against large-scale distributed threats, and work related to CODON. It 
should be clear by the end of this chapter that the internet needs defensive options capable of 
scaling as easily as common threats already do. 
 The Internet 2.1
Thousands of independently-managed computer networks known as autonomous 
systems (ASes) across the world connect to form a vast and decentralized “network of 
networks” known as the internet. The internet lacks a central point of authority governing its 
operation, and owes much of its success and growth to cleverly-designed and evolving protocols 
that enable different ASes to interoperate despite their technological, political, and ideological 
differences. These protocols generally, but imperfectly, allow the internet to be resilient to 
localized system failures and require minimal state to be maintained by each AS, in many cases 
adapting to topology changes with little or no human interaction. In general, systems and 
services can join the vast internet without requiring the rest of the internet to first undergo 
costly upgrades, re-architecture, or widespread manual intervention. Decentralized services that 
support the internet such as the Domain Name System (DNS) require a degree of centralized 
management for human convenience, but data can generally flow between distant networks in 
the absence of central overarching management. A key incentive for the various ASes to 
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cooperate is the concept of “fate sharing”: various ASes and the internet as a whole will succeed 
or fail together, so it is generally in an AS’s best interest to cooperate with others to ensure its 
own survival. Fate sharing requires a shared goal and a degree of implicit trust between ASes, 
and this is simply not enough to ensure that malicious AS administrators [61] or the coordinated 
effort of rogue systems inside otherwise well-behaved ASes will not affect internet operations in 
undesirable ways. 
 Overlay Networks 2.2
An overlay network is a subset of nodes in a network that functionally form another 
network; in other words, an overlay network is a network within a larger “underlay network” 
whose topology may have little or no similarity to the underlay network. Consider the example 
of a four-node overlay network of computers running a simplified peer-to-peer file sharing 



















Figure 2.1 Nodes B, D, G, and I on geographically and administratively distinct networks connect via 
software to form an overlay network. The nodes then communicate with one another as though they 
are on the same network. 
In this example overlay network, the four nodes B, D, G, and I, behave as though they all 
reside on the same local network, while two of the nodes (G and I) actually reside on different 
continents with numerous ASes separating them. When a node in the overlay network wishes to 
search for a particular file or share some useful information via peer-to-peer file sharing 
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software, it will broadcast the search request to its neighbors in the overlay network while 
remaining functionally unaware of neighbors in the underlay network. 
Overlay networks are commonly formed via the use of peer-to-peer software, as the 
example above suggested. At its simplest, peer-to-peer software is software that enables 
multiple computers on a network to communicate directly with one another with minimal, if 
any, reliance on dedicated and stable centralized servers. Peer-to-peer file sharing software 
such as BitTorrent [13] has been used to cheaply distribute entire operating systems in parallel 
amongst technical users as in the case of Debian Linux and many others [64], to distribute 
enthusiast-generated multimedia content amongst niche online communities [51], and even to 
distribute software updates for mainstream commercial video games [9]. In the case of 
BitTorrent, a “torrent” file is used to describe the shared file and to direct clients to a “tracker”. 
The tracker is a server that tracks other clients, or “peers,” with partial or full copies of the data 
described in the torrent file, though it is possible to discover peers by other methods, but the 
tracker does not distribute the shared file. File data is typically subdivided into many small 
chunks to allow for fast parallel downloading from multiple peers that may not yet have a full 
copy of the data. A peer with a full copy of the desired data is known as a “seed,” and a high 
seed-to-peer ratio ensures quick distribution of the data to new peers. A key disadvantage of 
peer-to-peer file sharing software such as BitTorrent is that the quality of service can fluctuate 
greatly with peer churn in the network, or “swarm,” as many participants join only long enough 
to download their desired files and quickly leave the swarm to conserve their own resources 
such as network bandwidth. Without enough seeds in the swarm or with too much churn, it 
becomes possible that a peer may not be able to collect all the chunks shared throughout the 
swarm to assemble a full copy of the original data. 
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Peer-to-peer file sharing also places inherent trust in fellow swarm participants who 
may claim to host legitimate content while actually providing no data or malicious data. Hashing 
can be used to validate the integrity of data distributed by participants, introducing a slight 
performance impact on participants as the hashing process and the hashes themselves require 
additional effort to generate, distribute, and verify, but the trust issue remains. For example, an 
attacker could share a virus purporting to be a recording of a musical performance and publish 
the hash of that virus. Participants who download the virus can verify that the file has not been 
modified during distribution over the peer-to-peer network by hashing the downloaded chunks 
or the complete file, but they may not be able to verify the validity of the content, i.e. determine 
that the file is really a virus, until a particular chunk or in some cases the entire file has been 
downloaded. We illustrate this problem below in Figure 2.2 using the example of a large file that 
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Figure 2.2 Victim V downloads a tampered Linux installation DVD via BitTorrent. Hashing the file 
downloaded from the swarm shows that the file was not tampered in transit, but the end result is still 
untrustworthy because the file was tampered before entering the swarm. It is difficult to verify that the 
file has the desired contents until the download is complete. 
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The Skype [62] audio/video conferencing system uses a hybrid peer-to-peer and client-
server model, initially leveraging end-user resources to reduce the burden placed on expensive 
centralized server resources. As it has grown in worldwide popularity and server resources have 
become less expensive, Skype and its parent company Microsoft have shifted much of the 
computing burden toward centralized servers known as “supernodes” and removed the ability 
for Skype users to participate as supernodes [27,28]. An important advantage of this hybrid 
approach is that the overlay network is more resilient to participant churn as many users join 
and disconnect from the network. This has become increasingly common as users shift away 
from running the Skype client software on desktop computers in favor of laptops and other 
portable devices that have additional resource constraints such as limited battery life and 
intermittent network connectivity. Skype’s change from a primarily peer-to-peer architecture to 
the more traditional client-server architecture has been criticized due to the potential loss of 
privacy caused by temporarily storing call-related data on company-owned servers. 
 The Security Triad 2.3
The concepts of confidentiality, integrity, and availability are widely discussed in the 
field of information security, and are commonly referred to collectively as the security triad or 
the mnemonic “CIA triad.” This triad is pertinent to almost every resource an administrator 
might seek to protect, and network-based attacks seek to subvert at least one of the three 
elements of the triad. Regulatory requirements and standards [32] often require that specific 
elements of the security triad be addressed to protect particular categories of sensitive 










SQL injection via 
“product search” web 
form could modify or 
divulge sensitive data 
A, I, C Perform input validation and sanitize form field contents 
before performing query on back-end product database. Do 
not grant write/modify privileges to DB account used by 
web server. 
Sudden high volume of 
shoppers overburdens 
server 
A Use a load balancing system to distribute requests across 
multiple web servers. Optimize system software and 
architecture to minimize resources consumed when 
processing requests and serving results. 
Software glitch causes 
existing customer data 
to be overwritten 
when a new customer 
makes a purchase 
I Require changes to software to be reviewed and approved 
by management before implementation. Perform thorough 
testing on separate testing or “staging” servers before 
installing software on production servers. 
 
Confidentiality entails ensuring that a sensitive resource is disclosed only to its intended 
audience(s), commonly through the use of data encryption or strict access controls. Integrity is 
the protection of a resource against unauthorized or undesired changes, including deletion or 
corruption, and includes proving whether a resource was tampered with via the use of audit 
logs, file hashing, and encryption certificate-based digital signatures. Availability is ensuring that 
a resource continues to function as designed and can be both successfully and timely accessed 
when needed. Though an administrator is often concerned about safeguarding all three 
elements of the security triad for a resource on the network, there are instances in which one or 
two elements may not be important; for example, the message contents of a severe weather 
alert warning system may by its very nature not require confidentiality safeguards, whereas the 
message’s integrity and availability may be of paramount importance. 
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 Asymmetric and Symmetric Key Cryptography 2.4
Put simply, encryption is the process of modifying a message in such a way that only its 
intended recipient(s) may understand it, protecting the encrypted message’s content from being 
divulged to a third party if intercepted. We refrain from presenting an exhaustive explanation of 
cryptography in this section, as it is a field of study unto itself. Instead, we present a high level 
overview of the encryption process and briefly discuss the elements of cryptography pertinent 
to our work: symmetric and asymmetric key cryptography. The interested reader is referred to 
[3] for a more thorough coverage of cryptography. 
In cryptography, the original unencrypted message is referred to as “plaintext.” 
Plaintext is encrypted using a carefully devised function known as a “cipher,” and the resulting 
encrypted message is known as the “ciphertext.” Ciphers use plaintext and a “key” as input, 
where the key is usually a secret string that is unfeasible to correctly guess or compute given the 
ciphertext. A good cipher similarly makes it unfeasible to correctly guess or compute the 
plaintext given the ciphertext. There are numerous ciphers of varying complexity, and many are 
available for public use and analysis while many others remain closely guarded secrets. If an 
attacker is able to intercept ongoing encrypted communication and is also able to determine the 
cipher and key used for decryption, it is often a trivial task to derive the plaintext, thereby 
defeating the encryption. 
For an encryption algorithm to be useful, the intended recipient must be able to convert 
the received ciphertext into plaintext. Therefore, both the sender and the intended recipient 
must agree in advance upon a cipher and use appropriate key(s) for encrypting and/or 
decrypting communication. Cryptographic algorithms may be divided into two classes based on 
their use of keys: symmetric key cryptography, in which the sender and receiver use the same 
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key to encrypt and decrypt all messages; and asymmetric key cryptography or “public key 
cryptography,” in which messages are encrypted using a publicly available key and decrypted 
using a privately held key. Symmetric key ciphers are generally faster than asymmetric key 
ciphers and symmetric keys tend to be stronger than asymmetric keys for a given key length, but 
symmetric ciphers require that both parties agree on a shared secret in advance and this can be 
quite burdensome. Asymmetric key cryptography tends to perform more slowly than symmetric 
key cryptography but allows many parties to encrypt messages to the same recipient using a 
publicly available key. 
It is possible for two parties to establish a shared secret key in such a way that a third 
party eavesdropping on communications between them cannot determine the agreed upon 
secret without significant computational effort, and this is frequently done via the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange protocol [10]. Unfortunately this exchange is subject to a “man in the 
middle” attack wherein an attacker could both intercept and modify communications between 
the sender and the recipient and cause them to unwittingly establish shared secrets with the 
attacker instead of with one another. Asymmetric key cryptography removes the need for each 
party to establish a shared secret to communicate with one another securely. The de facto 
standard for asymmetric key cryptography is RSA, in which a party generates a public key and a 
private key that are mathematically related. Although the keys are related, when they are 
properly generated it is extremely difficult to derive the private key given the public key since 
there are no known algorithms for efficiently factoring arbitrarily large numbers. The public key 
is made available for anyone to use when encrypting communication destined for the key pair’s 
owner, and the private key is the only key capable of decrypting the communication. The Diffie 
Hellman key exchange and use of RSA key pairs are described in more detail in [20] and [21]. 
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To take advantage of the generally faster performance of symmetric key encryption, 
avoid the need to agree upon a shared secret offline, and work around the man in the middle 
problem, it is common for the sender and receiver to use asymmetric encryption during the 
session establishment process, as in the case of the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [18]. 
Within this encrypted conversation, both parties agree upon a symmetric key and subsequently 
use a symmetric cipher to encrypt their communications. When using a symmetric cipher, 
parties often choose to establish a replacement key, or to “re-key,” once a predetermined time 
has elapsed or a certain number of bytes have been transferred. This reduces the amount of 
time available to an attacker to correctly guess the symmetric key and in turn decrypt the 
ongoing conversation. 
 Vulnerabilities, Threats, Exploits, Safeguards, and Remediation 2.5
Vulnerabilities are weaknesses or defects that make it possible for attackers, or even 
inept administrators and users, to render a system inoperable or to cause the system to perform 
undesirable actions not intended by the creator or administrator. Remediation is the process of 
fixing a particular vulnerability and/or recovering from an aftermath of an exploit. Exploits are 
software tools or other mechanisms of taking advantage of a particular vulnerability. The most 
effective exploits are those for which no remediation actions have yet been developed or 
published, typically because the corresponding vulnerability is not widely known or is difficult to 
quickly remediate due to cost or complexity. Such exploits are known as zero-day exploits. 
Widely-used and emerging standards and technologies exist for describing and sharing 
information about computer vulnerabilities, exploits, and remediation actions. These include 
MITRE’s Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures® (CVE®) [40] and Open Vulnerability and 
Assessment Language® (OVAL®) [41], as well as the US Department of Commerce’s National 
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Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)’s effort to synthesize and automate the use of 
computer security standards via the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP) [43]. A 
promising future resource for large-scale remediation is NIST’s emerging Common Remediation 
Enumeration (CRE) standard [42], which defines remediation steps in an automation-friendly 
format as well a framework for distributed remediation publishing. 
Two commonly deployed software tools used to detect running software and related 
known vulnerabilities are Nessus [69] and nmap [38]. Such software is used by system 
administrators and attackers alike to detect vulnerabilities for the purposes of proactive threat 
remediation and reconnaissance, respectively. And while several commercial tools such as 
Nexpose [56] exist to summarize vulnerabilities and track remediation steps, these tools are by 
their nature ill-suited for detecting actual attack activity. 
 Intrusion Detection and Prevention Systems 2.6
Many organizations and some home users employ intrusion detection systems (IDS), 
intrusion prevention systems (IPS), and/or intrusion detection and prevention systems (IDPS). 
An intrusion detection system (IDS) passively detects malicious or suspicious behavior and only 
logs the event for future reporting. Unlike an IDS, an IPS can perform reactive functions such as 
disconnecting and preventing network communication between the parties involved in 
suspicious activity. An IDPS performs the functions of both an IDS and an IPS, but the distinction 
between an IPS and IDPS is somewhat nebulous and IDPS tends to be the favored term. The 
most commonly used and well-regarded open-source IDPS is Snort [11], although the 
multithreaded Suricata [48] IDPS has arisen as a new contender with performance features like 
multithreading and experimental graphics card acceleration support. 
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An IDS can rely on detection of statistically anomalous behavior that varies from an 
established baseline in an organization, as well as known behavior patterns or “signatures” to 
detect or prevent undesirable behavior. Establishing a baseline of what is considered normal 
activity on a network requires the administrator to understand what normal really means, or 
should mean, for the network in question. This baseline can become skewed if unusual activity 
occurs while the baseline is being established. With very large networks and with home users it 
can be difficult to establish a baseline due the wide range of activity that legitimately occurs on 
the network. 
Unlike statistical behavior based detection, signature based detection is not tailored to a 
particular network and the signatures can easily be shared and used by IDS administrators 
throughout the internet community. Nevertheless, great skill is required to create an efficient 
and precise signature that detects undesirable behavior with no or minimal false positive 
detections. Creating signatures requires careful analysis of the raw network communication or 
“packet captures” between the misbehaving host and the victim, which can be further 
complicated by the ubiquity of firewalls, network address translation, and other hosts that 
legitimately modify network communication between hosts. Packet capture analysis is further 
complicated by the existence of multiple hosts communicating over the same network 
simultaneously, making it difficult to isolate communication strictly related to the suspicious or 
malicious behavior. And while signatures are widely distributed online, file size and concerns 
about divulging sensitive internal communications and private network topology cause packet 
captures to be less commonly shared for public analysis. 
The use of an IDS inside a very large organization’s network still provides a very limited 
view of malicious behavior on the internet, making it difficult to identify whether the behavior is 
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part of a larger scale attack affecting multiple organizations. Few organizations have a view of 
large geographical regions, so the collection of very large scale network traffic data is left to 
transit providers, content distribution networks (discussed briefly in Section 2.9.3), and research 
organizations with whom the former are willing to share useful data samples. Public access to 
large scale attack data is very limited, typically consisting of select researchers’ analysis rather 
than the actual data. 
 Firewalls 2.7
Firewalls are network security systems commonly implemented at the edge or border of 
a network to separate a network from other networks outside the administrator’s control. 
Firewalls are also used to separate multiple networks within a larger network controlled by the 
same administrator based on organizational or regulatory security requirements. Firewalls are 
commonly implemented as dedicated network hardware appliances, as software installed on a 
computer as an add-on package, as an operating system feature. Firewall functionality is usually 
embedded into the firmware of the “all-in-one” multifunction routers leased or rented by many 
ISPs to their customers. Ingress and egress control decisions are based on sets of rules 
configured on the firewall and may be as simple as allowing or denying communication between 
two IP address ranges and a particular port number – for example, “allow traffic from 10.0.0.0 
via TCP port 80 to 192.168.0.0 via any port.” More complex rules may use multiple criteria, and 
sets of rules may be chained together to enforce finer-grained control over traffic. While any 
firewall can filter traffic based on source and destination IP addresses, subnets and ports, more 
advanced firewalls use stateful packet inspection or even application-layer protocol inspection 
to make more intelligent access control decisions based on session state and application 
behavior. Firewalls provide logging mechanisms that can usually be configured to adjust the 
14 
 
verbosity and level of detail and may produce a large volume of log data under load. This log 
data can prove very useful for troubleshooting and security event correlation when used in 
conjunction with an IDPS or specialized log correlation software, but storage and processing 
constraints tend to limit the amount and detail of log data retained by smaller organizations. 
 Honeypots and Honeynets 2.8
Honeypots are systems used by researchers and various organizations which have been 
made intentionally by the administrator to be vulnerable to known threats. By allowing an 
attacker to compromise a honeypot and access it for some period of time instead of preventing 
the attack with an IDPS or other tools, the administrator can observe an attacker’s subsequent 
activity even down to the keystroke and gain insight into the attacker’s behavior and the tools 
used by the attacker. In practice, the ubiquity and decreasing cost of server virtualization makes 
it possible for an administrator to configure a honeypot, allow it to be compromised, and later 
revert the honeypot to an uncompromised state with very little effort. It is very important that 
the attacker believe the honeypot is a legitimate system, and toward that end honeypot systems 
such as Honeyd [55] have been developed which mimic even the nuanced behavior of various 
operating systems’ TCP/IP stacks. A honeynet is a collection of honeypot systems working 
together in concert to provide a more thorough observation of an attacker’s activity or simply 
waste an attacker’s time and resources by fooling the attacker into believing the honeynet 
contains useful information to steal. Similar to a honeynet but much less interactive, a “network 
telescope” or “darknet” is a system that observes activity targeting unused IP addresses under 
the assumption that legitimate traffic would not attempt to access those addresses, as in the 
case of the UCSD Network Telescope [14]. The USCD Network Telescope uses a very large and 
mostly empty block of publicly reachable IP addresses (a /8 block or roughly 16,777,216 
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addresses) that is passively monitored for malicious activity and provides the logged data to 
select security researchers for analysis. Honeypots and honeynets can provide valuable 
information about emerging network-based attack behaviors and trends, whether distributed or 
more localized. An important aspect missing from traditional honeypot systems is end-user or 
client interaction, as they generally focus on observing how an attacker interacts with a server 
or service rather than how an end-user interacts with an attacker and the attacker’s ensuing 
response to end-user stimulus. In response to this shortcoming, “client honeypot” systems such 
as PhoneyC [45] have been developed which mimic end-user behavior such as browsing the web 
for executable files or simulating a user opening links included in unsolicited emails. Both 
traditional and client honeypot systems are well-suited for use in conjunction with the CODON 
Sensor software that we describe later in Section 3.3.3. 
 Distributed Attacks  2.9
The internet’s oft-used nickname of “information superhighway” is appropriate: it 
allows a very large number of people to access distant destinations quickly, whether with good 
or evil intent. A distributed attack is an attack against a system via multiple attacking nodes that 
cooperate in an attempt to inflict greater damage or increase the probability of a successful 
attack than is possible with a single attacking node. Such attacks leverage the power of the 
internet’s decentralized and scalable nature for harm rather than good. The internet is designed 
to allow participants to easily and quickly communicate with one another, not to hinder 
communication, and this opens many avenues for malicious participants to wreak havoc. 
2.9.1 Distributed Denial of Service and Botnets 
The most well-known distributed attack is the distributed denial of service (DDoS) 
attack. In this attack, a large number of systems work in concert to overwhelm a victim’s system 
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with service requests or other network traffic. These requests are often incomplete or 
malformed in such a way that the victim is forced to expend much more effort responding to the 
requests than the attacker expends sending them [72]. As the victim attempts to process and 
respond to each incoming malicious service request, the victim quickly becomes unable to 
respond to legitimate requests in a timely manner, sometimes even stopping completely under 
the enormous load. There are many variations on the DDoS attack tailored to different 
applications and network protocols. In a so-called reflection attack, attacking hosts send forged 
requests containing a victim’s IP address in the sender or source IP field to innocent servers that 
are configured to respond to incoming requests. This causes the innocent servers to “reflect” a 
large amount of traffic to the victim while obscuring the real attacker’s identity [72]. DDoS 
attacks can be difficult to distinguish from legitimate so-called “flash crowds” of users 
attempting to access a system simultaneously due to a sudden growth in the system’s popularity 
[53]. We illustrate a successful DDoS attack based on a victim’s network bandwidth below in 
Figure 2.3. 
Participants in a DDoS attack are usually part of a network of compromised systems 
known as a “botnet.” Participants in a botnet are referred to as “zombies” or “bots,” and are 
controlled by a limited number of people and systems. Botnet architecture has evolved and 
scaled well over time. Early botnets used a traditional client-server hierarchy with commands 
sent in plaintext via the simple internet relay chat (IRC) protocol, and stopping a botnet was as 
simple as blocking incoming IRC traffic on one’s network, and the botnet controller’s IRC chat 
room was usually easy to find through simple analysis of a packet capture from the victim’s 
network. Today’s botnets have achieved a new level of sophistication and larger scale through 
the use of peer-to-peer architecture to control the zombies and obscure the controller, and 
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public key cryptography to digitally sign exploit tools and commands as in the case of the 
Gameover Zeus malware distributed via the Cutwail spam botnet [68]. Modern botnets are 
notoriously difficult to shut down, and continue to be a subject of great interest to the 























Figure 2.3 Node D has compromised nodes A, E, H, K, L, and O to form a botnet. D can order the botnet 
to attack V with a combined attack bandwidth of 130mb/s, overwhelming V’s 100mb/s connection and 
denying legitimate access to services hosted by both V and its neighbor W. Neighbors of botnet nodes 
may also be impacted. 
2.9.2 Hacktivism and Voluntary Botnets 
Not all distributed attacks are performed by unknowing participant systems. In some 
instances these attacks are performed by users seeking to gain notoriety or create awareness of 
an ideological or political issue in what is known as hacking-based activism or “hacktivism.” 
“Hacktivists” with minimal technical skills may install software developed by more skilled 
hacktivists to participate in a distributed attack either directly by initiating an attack in concert 
with other hacktivists. In the case of the popular and open source Low Orbit Ion Cannon (LOIC) 
software’s [46] “hive mind” mode, hacktivists volunteer to join a botnet controlled by an IRC 
channel or RSS newsfeed and leave the software running unobtrusively on their computers 
without manual intervention. Disregarding past web browsing behavior such as searching for 
the LOIC software installer, using hive mind LOIC ostensibly gives the hacktivist a small degree of 
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plausible deniability: the hacktivist may deny being a willing participant and plausibly claim 
instead to be the victim of a botnet infection. Unfortunately for some participants, while the 
LOIC software has proven to be effective, it makes no attempt to disguise the hacktivist’s source 
IP address. In just one notable example, more than a dozen hacktivists and LOIC users were 
identified and prosecuted for their participation in “Operation Payback” [58]. Operation Payback 
was a hacktivist campaign in late 2010 - early 2011 to launch DDoS attacks against various banks 
and payment processing services, purportedly in response to their refusal to process donations 
to WikiLeaks after WikiLeaks published a large collection of secret diplomatic messages from 
United States embassies and consulates to the State Department. 
2.9.3 Defending Against Distributed Attacks 
Interesting research topics in collaborative defense methods to reduce the power of 
DDoS attacks include path marking, where routers cooperate to identify sources of attack traffic, 
allowing the victim to distinguish attack traffic from legitimate traffic; and pushback, wherein 
routers cooperate to block the attack traffic as close to the attack source as possible [47]. 
DefCOM [39], developed at UCLA’s Laboratory for Advanced Systems Research, is a promising 
collaborative defense system with which our CODON framework shares similarities. Unlike some 
collaborate defense systems that require all networks between the attacker and victim to 
participate, DefCOM provides DDoS defense using heterogeneous participants performing 
different tasks. DefCOM’s defense functions are attack detection, traffic rate limiting, and traffic 
differentiation. Defense-related communication is performed over a peer-to-peer overlay 
network. DefCOM’s research team claims DefCOM is effective with non-participants between 
the attacker and victim, and that the small scale tests they performed with real computers 
(around 200 nodes) is more realistic than other tests due to the infidelity of network simulation 
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software under DDoS conditions. While DefCOM shares some similarities to our work, namely 
the use of heterogeneous participants and peer-to-peer communication, our CODON framework 
takes a more holistic approach to security and threat information sharing rather than focusing 
solely on DDoS defense. 
Many organizations subscribe to content distribution networks (CDN) such as Akamai [2] 
to more quickly deliver web pages and multimedia content instead of relying solely on servers 
on their own premises. These CDNs consist of servers at well-connected locations throughout 
the world where they can serve requests from global clients much more quickly than from a 
single location. The strategic positioning and high bandwidth of CDNs enables them to also work 
as load balancing systems for their subscribers, diminishing the effect of DDoS attacks by being 
able to sustain high traffic volumes and limiting the geographical regions of legitimate end-users 
that may be prevented from accessing CDN subscribers’ systems by a successful DDoS. 
Comparing a DDoS attack to a large mob of people trying to enter the front entrance to an 
amusement park, using a CDN simply makes the entrance wider or adds more entrances to 
accommodate a larger mob. This is an effective strategy for network bandwidth-based attacks 
but is not cost effective for all organizations and will eventually fail to scale as attackers devise 
new bandwidth-intensive DDoS attacks. The CloudFlare [2] CDN also acts as a caching and 
filtering system to prevent malicious requests from reaching a subscriber’s website. Research 
into methods to quickly deliver content from CDNs to end-users is ongoing and includes closer 
collaboration with ISPs [25], but we do not believe faster content delivery alone will necessarily 
contribute to security for the internet community as a whole. 
Locasto et al.’s Worminator [37] project is a peer-to-peer alert distribution system that 
creates and distributes alerts from multiple organizations to generate inter-organizational threat 
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“watchlists” and seeks to provide a more global view of attacks with similarities to our CODON 
framework. While Worminator’s goal of collaborative defense is similar, CODON differs greatly 
in the scale of participation. Whereas in [37] Worminator searches for suspicious traffic using 
homogenous IDS and alerting systems at four different sites within the United States, with the 
majority of alerts coming from the Columbia University’s computer science department’s 
network, we seek to leverage heterogeneous data sources and detection mechanisms based not 
only on dedicated IDS equipment in well-resourced organizations, but on a multitude of hosts 
including those of end-users worldwide. 
 Reputation-based Access Control: Blacklists and Whitelists 2.10
A very common method for controlling access to a limited or sensitive resource is 
through the use of lists known as blacklists and whitelists. Blacklists, sometimes also referred to 
as blocklists, explicitly enumerate who may not access a resource and whitelists conversely 
enumerate who may access a resource. Many systems are capable of using blacklists and 
whitelists to control access to network-based resources including firewalls, email servers, web 
servers, and remote systems administration servers. Blacklists are typically used to deny access 
to known offenders or abusers of a system. While a whitelist serves as the authoritative listing 
of who may access a resource, additional actions may be required before that resource may be 
accessed. In the context of email servers, blacklists known as DNS-based blackhole lists (DNSBL) 
[66] are used to ignore or refuse service requests from systems that have earned a reputation 
for sending undesirable email such as spam or malware. Some individual email users employ a 
whitelist to only receive email messages from senders they know and trust, thereby protecting 
them from unknown senders. 
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Blacklists and whitelists can be very effective access controls for protecting a resource, 
but they often require substantial effort to accurately maintain and keep up to date over time as 
system requirements change and the internet grows. The very restrictive nature of whitelisting 
tends to limit its usefulness to special cases and small-scale/intra-network use since all the 
potential users of a resource must be known in advance. In contrast to whitelisting, both the 
burdens and benefits of blacklist maintenance can be shared by many organizations and people. 
Collaborative blacklist maintenance and distribution allows a large number of systems to benefit 
from the negative experience of relatively few victims. Therefore blacklisting is commonly 
employed by email servers and firewalls for protection from notorious malicious systems. 
False positives will inevitably enter collaboratively maintained blacklists. These false 
positives could be the result of mistakes by blacklist contributors, but are more commonly 
caused by transient misbehavior by a normally benign system. This transient misbehavior may 
be due to improper system configuration, system compromise by an attacker, or the 
misbehavior of a limited number of system users inside a small area of a larger network. It can 
be difficult to convince blacklist maintainers that a false positive is in fact a false positive, even if 
a blacklist maintainer uses dedicated staff to handle removal requests as in the case of the 
popular Spamhaus [66] and SORBS [54]. Because different collaboratively maintained blacklists 
may use different criteria to judge whether a system is malicious, it may be beneficial to use 
multiple blacklists to restrict access to a system. Blacklist lookup tools such as the Anti-Abuse 
Project’s Multi-RBL Check [4] are available to aid in determining which common blacklists 
include a particular system. These tools can be useful to system administrators investigating 
suspicious activity observed on their systems by the administrators to correlate the suspicious 
host’s source IP address with the observations of multiple blacklist maintainers. Blacklist lookup 
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tools are also useful to the administrators of false positive or formerly compromised systems as 
it can be difficult to know which particular blacklist(s) may be causing other systems to block 
legitimate communication. 
The OpenBL.org project [49] maintains blacklists based on sources of attacks detected 
by almost four dozen servers distributed across the globe. When software on one of these 
servers detects brute force login attempts or certain other webserver-related attacks, the 
software automatically emails the attacking system’s presumed owner based on contact 
information gleaned from the Whois databases of regional internet registries and the DNS SOA 
(Source of Authority) resource record corresponding to the attacker’s IP address. The project 
managers publish inception-to-date historical attack statistics as well as blacklists that are based 
on specific attacks and the past 90, 60, and 30 days’ data. Unfortunately, despite the “open” in 
its name, only the blacklists themselves and some statistics are available the general public to 
access. The public can only contribute to the project by donating servers or money, not by 
running OpenBL’s software on their own systems or directly contributing to software 
development and system management. 
 Collaborative and Cooperative Defense 2.11
The power and efficacy of a distributed attack largely depends on the amount of 
resources at the attacker’s disposal being greater than the amount of resources at the victim’s 
disposal. Increasing the victim’s resources or efficiency of resource use is a common way to 
defend against a distributed attack, but this scaling of resources to correspond to a scaling 
attack can be quite costly. As an alternative defensive approach that reduces the need for 
expensive resource scaling, the victim can collaborate with other systems to slow down and 
possibly stop the attack’s resource usage. In some situations, a simple phone call or email to the 
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administrator of a zombie-infested network may be sufficient to disconnect infected hosts from 
the network and cripple the attacker’s resources. However, administrator-to-administrator 
communication is not as effective in a widely-distributed attack and can be hindered by the 
usual human communication barriers of language, time zone differences, administrator 
availability, organizational priorities, and even indifference to the victim’s plight. 
In November of 1988, Cornell University student Robert Tappan Morris unleashed the 
so-called Morris Worm [65], allegedly in an attempt to measure the size of the internet. The 
worm exploited common vulnerabilities in UNIX software and resulted in an unprecedented self-
perpetuating DoS attack as the victim computers became infected by the worm multiple times 
and slowed down further with each infection. In response to the Morris Worm outbreak, the 
first computer security incident response team (CSIRT), known as the CERT Coordination Center 
or simply CERT/CC [63], was formed at Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering 
Institute. The goal of a CSIRT is, as the name implies, to provide a quick and coordinated 
response to security incidents from detection to remediation and taking steps to prevent similar 
incidents in the future. A CSIRT is often activated on an as-needed basis and consists of a subset 
of key staff in an organization with complementary roles such as security analysts, firewall 
administrators, system administrators, and managers. Some larger CSIRTs such as CERT/CC and 
the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) serve broader segments of 
the internet community on an ongoing basis by publishing guidance about cybersecurity best 
practices and disseminating announcements about important software updates, and high-
profile threats and attacks. 
Information sharing and analysis centers, or ISACs, are coalitions of critical infrastructure 
professionals formed to facilitate sharing and analyzing information about threats to common 
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interests in specific infrastructure sectors. ISACs exist for many sectors including the research 
and higher education community (REN-ISAC) [57], and the threats in which they are interested 
are not strictly computer based as in the case of Supply Chain ISAC [59]. Since the information 
shared within an ISAC is based on the experience of fellow community members and the 
analysis of this information is similarly focused toward benefiting the same community’s 
security, an ISAC can be a very valuable and relevant source of security information. The 
sensitivity of the threat information that is sometimes shared within an ISAC often requires a 
moderate to high level of trust to be established with a participant before the participant may 
receive deep or meaningful analysis of threat information from the ISAC, sometimes leaving 
marginal participants and the public completely unaware of useful information generated 
through the ISAC’s efforts. 
Larger CSIRTs such as US-CERT and ISACs commonly use “newsfeed” technologies like 
Really Simple Syndication (RSS) and email discussion lists to share security-related 
announcements, but these announcements typically take the form of verbal descriptions in a 
loosely structured format. Unlike antimalware or IDPS signature subscriptions, these 
announcements are intended for human consumption and place the burden on interested 
system administrators to read and manually act on the announcements. CSIRTs and ISACs form 
a valuable segment of the internet community, and we wish to incorporate their efforts into a 
scalable and automated cooperative defensive system that even the general public may use to 
level the figurative playing field between relatively small victims and ever-growing and adaptive 
teams of attackers. 
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 Crowdsourcing and Wikis 2.12
“Crowdsourcing” is a term used to describe the use of a large and often geographically 
distributed number of people with varying skill levels to perform a large task. Perhaps the most 
well-known and successful example of crowdsourcing is the much-acclaimed Wikipedia online 
encyclopedia, which at this time hosts more than 31.9 million pages and bills itself as “the free 
encyclopedia that anyone can edit” [71]. Collaborative web publishing systems and the general 
model upon which Wikipedia and others are based are commonly referred to as “wikis” [15]. 
Crowdsourcing has proven to be very effective for accomplishing large tasks like 
documenting a wide breadth of topics online, but it is not without its pitfalls; organizational and 
policy issues exist since anyone can modify the system’s content. Wiki content is often 
“vandalized” to promote an ideology either contrary or completely unrelated to the wiki’s goal, 
or to shock, disgust, or amuse large numbers of wiki viewers. The quality of the wiki’s 
information can also be diluted by libelous information contributed by users with subversive or 
malicious intent, or even through simple ignorance, and contributors introduce or perpetuate 
bias that can be difficult to control without dedicated editorial oversight by other users. 
Common safeguards that have been developed to protect wikis against low-quality 
contributions include requiring all contributors to create a user account to log and track their 
historical activity, and the use of domain experts and reviewers with a history of positive 
contributions to review and approve wiki content changes. Employing more safeguards 
generally raises the bar for participation and discourages casual users from contributing 
information, which in turn may make the collaborative system less useful and further discourage 
contributions due to lack of popularity. Despite the use of safeguards against vandalism, it is still 
possible to spread misinformation through a wiki. Mainstream news outlets with editorial staff 
26 
 
have relied on Wikipedia articles containing fictitious information, leading to public 
embarrassment as in the case of [26]. 
 Crowdsourced Threat Identification via Web Browser Add-ons 2.13
Tools such as SmartNotes [60] rely on end-user participation via a web browser add-on 
to actively mark websites as being malicious or untrustworthy, and machine learning systems 
can be used to analyze such dynamically-produced data [24]. Prominent web browser tools such 
as AdBlock Plus [23] automatically block the downloading of obtrusive advertisements and 
optionally malware through the use of so-called community-maintained "filterlists." Filterlists 
are community-maintained pattern-based blacklists. In the case of the popular EasyList filterlist 
[19], changes are suggested by end-users in community discussion forums and later approved 
and distributed by community project leaders. While the CODON framework focuses on 
automated collection and distribution of threat sources, web browser based tools could trivially 
be integrated with CODON through a simple menu option, e.g. “report this page as malicious,” 
that logs the pertinent details for consumption by the CODON Sensor software, as we will 
discuss in Section 3.3.3. 
 Collateral Defense and the Neighborhood Watch Model 2.14
Two nontechnical examples that perhaps best summarize the concept of collateral 
defense are neighborhood watch programs and public notices. In a neighborhood watch 
program, residents of a neighborhood typically receive basic safety awareness training and 
agree to monitor the neighborhood for suspicious activity during their day-to-day activities and 
report such activity to local law enforcement personnel as well as fellow residents. Public 
notices are commonly posted to community billboards at grocery stores, on or near community 
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mailbox clusters, and at post offices to disseminate information about recent criminal activity, 
missing children, and upcoming events. In both of these nontechnical examples, the goal is to 
leverage the abundance of potential observers of criminal activity to assist the relatively few 
enforcers who are specially trained and equipped to directly address the perpetrators. Due to 
the ubiquity of consumer internet access and low level of technical skill required to connect to 
the internet, the vast majority of internet users lack the technical, let alone cybersecurity-
specific, resources available to large and well-funded organizations. We have designed the 
CODON framework to better leverage the disparity between “observers” and “enforcers” on the 
internet in the interest of protecting the internet community as a whole. Whereas distributed 
attacks such as a DDoS can cause collateral damage to a victim’s neighbors, CODONs seek to 
provide collateral defense to neighbors of participants. 
Our CODON framework describes a peer-to-peer overlay network formed either ad-hoc, 
which is the default and preferred method, or by formal agreement between two or more 
participants for the purpose of contributing to one another’s collective health and defense 
through timely and automated security-related information sharing. A geographically 
unbalanced CODON can provide value to its participants and neighbors within a geographical 
region, and a geographically balanced CODON can have an even greater impact by benefiting its 
many non-participant neighbors in many regions. Participants in a CODON may include AS 
administrators, research institutions, small corporate networks, computer enthusiasts, and 
novice home users. Indeed, a CODON will be most effective when comprised of a multitude of 
heterogeneous participants. 
We will describe the CODON framework in depth in Chapter 3, but Figure 3.1 provides a 
high level overview. The scope, level of detail, and accuracy of information provided by a 
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CODON participant will vary based on that participant’s capabilities. Some participants operate 
web servers and networks that are well-suited for publishing relatively static content like 
software updates or more dynamic content like blacklists with a low update frequency. Casual 
but technically adept internet users may work in loosely-knit teams to review and refine 
blacklists in their free time. Private sector and academic research labs may participate in sensor 
projects like the UCSD Network Telescope [14] to collect information about large-scale probing 
activity, or in some cases even track and seize control of botnets. Smaller organizations and 
consultants may have limited computing resources but can assess other participants’ network 
perimeter security via regular or ad-hoc vulnerability scans. Other organizations are uniquely 
placed as transit providers or ISPs and can perform bandwidth throttling or blocking of malicious 
traffic in response to a distributed attack, or detect large scale attacks that cannot be detected 
based only on sensor data from end-users’ computers.  
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3 CODON Architecture 
A core design goal of the CODON framework is the encouragement of automated 
sharing and usage of information about malicious activity. Each CODON participant fills at least 
one role in the CODON based on the resources the participant desires to contribute. These roles, 
summarized in Figure 3.1 and Table 3.2, focus on sharing security incident information and 
coordinating defensive activity. To maintain transparency and trust among CODON participants, 
and to promote the broadest base of adoption possible, we strongly urge participants to use 
open source software whenever possible for CODON operations. For example, peer-to-peer 
communication systems such as Chord [67], GNUnet [31] or Trust-X [22] should be used for 
organizing the various participants into an overlay network and OpenSSL [50] should be used to 
implement the various cryptographic functions required. Established and emerging open 
standards are used throughout our framework in the spirit of honesty and to encourage 
participation on an international scale. Options affecting privacy, performance, and network 
traffic volume should be exposed to the user via administrative utilities designed to provide a 
familiar user experience specific to the operating system on which the CODON software is 
installed. For example, in Linux the software configuration should be exposed through popular 
window managers’ settings menus and configuration files should be stored in /etc, 
/usr/local/etc, or another directory consistent with the particular Linux distribution, 
whereas in Apple OS X the configuration tools should function and appear similarly to other 
“System Preferences” panes. 
As we discussed earlier in Section 2.12, there is naturally great potential for abuse in 
systems that rely on a massive number of loosely affiliated users providing input for public 
consumption. For this reason, we have taken care to incorporate safeguards against abuse in 
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our design of the CODON framework. Encryption is used to reduce the likelihood of message 
tampering and selective message blocking by malicious third parties. A small number of reports 
of malicious activity only results in a small penalty for the offending entity. Misbehaving 
participants are silently ignored by other participants via an exponential back-off algorithm, 
CODON-wide informational updates are distributed peer-to-peer, and session state is kept to a 
minimum to reduce the havoc caused by a misbehaving participant. As a CODON grows in size, 
the effect of mischievous participants should be drowned out by the volume of good 
information provided by normal participants. All date and time data in the CODON are 





























Figure 3.1 A high level overview of security information sharing in a CODON. Even non-participants may 
benefit from the CODON’s efforts. 
 Ephemeral Blacklists 3.1
We will now describe ephemeral blacklists, a key concept in the CODON framework, in 
greater detail. An ephemeral blacklist is a blacklist containing IP addresses and subnets that 
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have been reported by CODON Sensors to have engaged in malicious or suspicious activity, each 
with a corresponding expiration timer. Ephemeral blacklists are compressed using common 
compression algorithms before transmission over the network whenever feasible to reduce the 
volume of network traffic sent by CODON participants. Consider our example of a very small 
ephemeral blacklist in Table 3.1. Each ephemeral blacklist is marked with a Type ID, an arbitrary 
but consistent 4 byte positive integer value corresponding to the type of information contained 
in the ephemeral blacklist. For example, a Type ID of 0x0001 may correspond to mail servers 
being used as spam relays, and 0x1336 may correspond to hosts caught attempting to 
repeatedly and rapidly guess user credentials via a web-based login form. When a Regional 
Aggregator receives a report of malicious activity via an Information Sharing Message (ISM, 
described in Section 3.4), it updates the appropriate ephemeral blacklist based on the Type ID 
included in the ISM. 
Suspected malicious hosts are temporarily blacklisted based on two criteria: whether a 
report is the first reported offense by a particular host, and the number of unique Sensors 
reporting the activity. If a suspected malicious host does not yet exist in the ephemeral blacklist, 
its IP address is temporarily stored in a “watchlist” for the current and next update cycle. 
Update cycles are explained in more detail throughout our discussion of Regional Aggregators in 
Section 3.3.1. If the reported host is already in the watchlist, it is moved to the ephemeral 
blacklist and given a short expiration of 15 minutes. However, if the reported host is already in 
the blacklist, its blacklist expiration increases. Each Sensor may only cause a particular expiration 
to increase once every two update cycles, effectively preventing a single host from blacklisting 




Table 3.1 Sample ephemeral blacklist of hosts engaging in port scanning activity 
(Metadata): Ephemeral Blacklist Type ID 0x0002, “Port scanning, 100 ports in < 5 seconds” 
Offending IP or CIDR subnet Expiration (UTC) 
10.0.0.1 2014-01-01 14:00 
10.1.0.0/24 2014-01-02 13:00 
10.3.3.7 2014-01-01 12:15 
10.50.2.0/31 2014-01-02 12:35 
 
As more hosts are added to an ephemeral blacklist over time, the blacklist is condensed 
when possible by grouping multiple IPs together into a single entry using classless inter-domain 
routing (CIDR) notation. CIDR notation is a concise means of denoting subnets using an IP 
address and a mask known as a “prefix”. The IP address range 10.0.0.0 - 10.0.0.255 is 
represented in CIDR notation as 10.0.0.0/24, where 10.0.0.0 is the beginning of the IP address 
range and /24 is the prefix, meaning that the first 24 bits in the given IP address remain the 
same and only the final 8 bits (the final octet of the IP address) can vary. Similarly, 10.0.0.0/16 
represents the IP address range 10.0.0.0 - 10.0.255.255, and 10.0.0.0/32 represents the single IP 
address 10.0.0.0. We only condense multiple IPs into CIDR notation when the consecutive IP 
addresses have expirations of twelve or more hours, causing the multiple consecutive IPs to be 
treated as a single entity using the largest expiration that applied to any of the consecutive IPs. 
Furthermore, once more than half of a /24 subnet is blacklisted, we treat the entire /24 subnet 
as malicious. We believe this is reasonable behavior based on Shue et al.’s observations about 
predominantly malicious ASes in [61]. Non-participants wishing to make use of ephemeral 
blacklist data published by CODON Repositories may be most interested in blacklisting hosts and 
subnets with expirations of at least 24 hours. 
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 Contributions by and to CODON Non-participants 3.2
As we have already discussed, the CODON framework is designed to benefit CODON 
participants and non-participants alike. Likewise, a CODON certainly benefits from the efforts of 
non-participants. The existence of a CODON would clearly be impossible without the efforts of 
the many non-participants who contribute to the infrastructure of the internet as a whole. We 
have grouped the key non-participants that are functionally most aligned with the CODON into 
two categories: Security Information Aggregators and Remediators. 
3.2.1 Security Information Aggregators 
Security Information Aggregators are non-participants who collect and curate, whether 
manually or with automated tools, security-related information that may be beneficial to the 
public. Examples of such information include lists of software vulnerabilities, IP ranges and DNS 
hostnames known to be used predominantly by malicious actors, malware distribution URLs, 
and hashes of dangerous files. Many organizations and individuals subscribe to Security 
Information Aggregators’ services, sometimes paying a fee or donating money in return for data 
that can be manually or automatically imported into their systems. For example, antimalware 
software vendors commonly charge a subscription fee for the ability to download new malware 
detection signatures, although they sometimes allow their antimalware software to continue 
functioning with an old signature set if the customer does not renew the subscription. Google 
provides a free service called Safe Browsing [30] and a corresponding API to query a list of 
potentially malicious or compromised websites, and the service is incorporated into Mozilla’s 
popular Firefox web browser and Google’s own Chrome browser. CODON leverages the “free” 
work of Security Information Aggregators to protect participants, and it is therefore only 
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appropriate that the CODON contribute as much relevant actionable intelligence back to these 
Security Information Aggregators as possible. 
3.2.2 Remediators 
Remediators are organizations that volunteer or are paid to fix network health and 
security problems. Application-level examples include software vulnerability patch creation and 
publishing by software developers and/or hosting services. This encompasses commercial 
software vendors’ update services, Linux package mirrors and repositories, popular open source 
software distributors like SourceForge [17] and GitHub [29], and security research organizations 
that publish temporary fixes for zero-day exploits. Network-level Remediators include those that 
either throttle or filter DDoS attack traffic to improve the quality of service for legitimate traffic 
flows as in the case of AT&T’s “scrubbing” system described in [7]. Also included in the 
Remediator category are CDNs that specialize in load-balancing traffic to protect their customers 
from DDoS attacks and flash crowds. 
 CODON Participant Roles 3.3
Participants in a CODON serve in one or more roles, as we will explain in more detail 
below. All CODON participants serve in the Sensor role by default but are encouraged to serve in 
additional roles as their resources may permit. Table 3.2 summarizes each role in the CODON 
framework, the role’s ease of participation or “minimum buy-in,” and examples of the various 




Table 3.2 CODON participant roles 
Role Ease of Participation Likely Participants 
Sensor Easy to difficult; requires the installation of 
a software service and access to minimal 
bandwidth. Active detection can be done 
with free software and low bandwidth. 
Large scale passive detection may require 
access to traffic monitoring tools or 
specialized hardware. 
Novice computer users, advanced/enthusiast 
computer users, universities, corporations, 
governments, researchers, information 
security organizations internet service and 




Medium; requires some database storage 
to manage participant state and blacklist 
data, and bandwidth to accommodate 
join/leave requests from many participants 
and to correlate and share incident data 
with other Regional Aggregators. 
Advanced/enthusiast computer users, 
universities, corporations, researchers, 
internet service providers, regional CSIRTS 
and ISACs, cloud computing providers. 
Repository Medium to difficult; requires a web server 
with good bandwidth and storage, ability 
to receive and share data from Regional 
Aggregators and non-participant Security 
Information Aggregators, e.g. spam 
blacklists, botnet zombie lists. 
Internet service providers, universities, 
software development companies, regional 





Easy to medium; requires a web server 
with reasonable uptime, bandwidth, and 
processing resources for effective 
matchmaking. 
Small companies, universities, information 
security organizations, non-profits. 
 
3.3.1 Regional Aggregator 
Regional Aggregators are, as the role name implies, responsible for aggregating security 
and threat information reported by CODON participants. Aggregating reports from thousands of 
participants and working in concert with other Regional Aggregators to provide the CODON with 
a regular global view of threats is a resource intensive task best suited to participants with 
reliable internet connectivity, modest bandwidth, midrange computing power, and system 
administrators with a better technical understanding than novice end-users. Most CODON 
participants will only fill the Sensor role, and the CODON Sensor software should have minimal 
resource requirements in order to encourage adoption and acceptance by users with limited 
technical knowledge. As mobile computing continues to proliferate in the form of lightweight 
laptops, smartphones, and other increasingly powerful portable devices, there is a clear need 
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for relatively well-resourced and well-connected participants to provide the fluctuating swarm 
of participants with stability and coordination. In this sense, Regional Aggregators are similar to 
Skype supernodes and BitTorrent trackers as discussed in Section 2.2; but unlike the Skype 
model, we do not believe it is necessary for a CODON’s Regional Aggregators to fall under the 
management of a single entity to be effective. In Figure 3.2, we illustrate the process by which a 
Regional Aggregator updates an ephemeral blacklist. 
Sensor S reports 
offender O,
Type ID = 0x0003
O already 
reported by S 
this cycle?








































Figure 3.2 A Regional Aggregator receives an ISM from Sensor S reporting that offender O is distributing 
malware. The Regional Aggregator considers updating its corresponding ephemeral blacklist. If not 
subscribed to the ISM’s Type ID, the Regional Aggregator passes the ISM to subscribing Regional 
Aggregators via the overlay network. 
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3.3.1.1 Participant State Database 
A participant may wish to limit the resources consumed by the system on which the 
CODON Regional Aggregator software operates. When the resource limit is reached, the 
Regional Aggregator should temporarily reject join attempts by new participants until sufficient 
resources are available to accommodate additional participants. Reasonable resource 
thresholds include a maximum number of concurrent participants, a maximum size for the 
Participant State Database, and a limit to the Regional Aggregator software’s mean network or 
CPU utilization. Resource usage can be further limited by only subscribing to a subset of Type 
IDs, but even modestly equipped modern computers with multithreading and sufficient RAM in 
conjunction with free database software should prove quite capable. Table 3.3 lists the state 
data a Regional Aggregator must manage for each participant. Notwithstanding overhead 
incurred by the particular database software employed to store and update participant state 
data, approximately 16.5 million participants’ 65-byte state could be stored in a 1 GB database, 
and we expect other resource-intensive tasks such as security incident data correlation, 
ephemeral blacklist management, and communication encryption overhead to be the primary 
causes of resource utilization for Regional Aggregators. 
Table 3.3 Participant state data maintained by a Regional Aggregator. 
Participant ID 
(UUID), 
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The Participant UUID is an RFC 4122 compliant 128-bit version 1 universally unique 
identifier (UUID) [36]. The timestamp portion of the UUID is based on the beginning of the 
participant’s session establishment process from the Regional Aggregator’s perspective. RFC 
4122 requires that the timestamp be based on the UTC representation of 100 nansecond 
intervals elapsed since 00:00:00.00, 15 October 1582. 
Participant Type Mask is a bit mask indicating which roles in addition to the mandatory 
Sensor role are filled by the participant. A value of 0 denotes that the participant is a Sensor, 1 
indicates the participant is a Repository, 2 indicates the participant is a Regional Aggregator, and 
4 indicates the participant is a Defensive Service Broker. Other powers of two are reserved for 
future use. Participants serving in multiple roles have a Participant Type Mask value equal to the 
sum of their individual roles. For example, a Participant Type Mask value of 3 indicates that the 
participant is a Sensor, a Repository, and a Regional Aggregator (0 + 1 + 2). 
The Participant Time Offset is essential for the Regional Aggregator to properly calculate 
ephemeral blacklist updates and correlate security incident data reported by multiple 
participants. This offset is stored as an 8 byte value representing the difference between the 
Participant’s reported time and the Regional Aggregator’s system time in 100 nanosecond 
intervals at the beginning of session establishment. The calculated time offset does not account 
for communication latency between the participant to the Regional Aggregator, but this latency 
may be disregarded for our purposes due to our use of update windows as described later in 
this section. Only 35 bits are necessary to store the Participant Time Offset because we do not 
permit the Participant’s clock to differ from the Regional Aggregator’s clock by more than ±900 
seconds (15 minutes), which is 18,000,000,000 100 ns intervals and can be stored in 35 bits 
using the two’s complement representation. While we could have chosen a 5 byte field size, 35 
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bits is 4.5 bytes, and in the interest of simplified database storage and computation, we chose to 
round up to the next power of two, which is a more easily managed 8 bytes. Participants are 
temporarily assigned a placeholder Partipant ID of 00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000 
until the participant_join process, described in Section 3.3.1.3, is complete and the session 
with the Regional Aggregator has been established. 
Cool Down Period indicates the remaining number of update cycles the Regional 
Aggregator should ignore updates provided by the participant due to misbehavior or other 
difficulty communicating with the participant. An update cycle occurs every five minutes, and 
thus a Cool Down Period of 288 indicates that the Regional Aggregator should ignore the 
participant for one day (1,440 minutes). Each update cycle in which the participant has 
misbehaved results in the cool down period doubling via a simple truncated exponential back off 
algorithm with a maximum permitted Cool Down Period of 512 (1 day, 18 hours, 40 minutes). 
Each update cycle in which the participant has not misbehaved results in the Cool Down Period 
decrementing by one until the Cool Down Period eventually reaches zero. 
The session age, in update cycles, is stored in the Age field. Sensors have a maximum 
age of 512 update cycles (1 days, 18 hours, 40 minutes), and participants serving in additional 
roles have double that maximum age. At the end of each update cycle, the Age field is 
incremented until the maximum age is reached. Once the maximum Age is reached, the 
Regional Aggregator sends a participant_rejoin message to the participant and removes 
the participant from its Participant State Database. This process helps ensure that inactive 
participants that were unable to complete the participant_leave process are eventually 
culled from the CODON to reduce unnecessary resource consumption while avoiding the need 
for regular “heartbeat” traffic between participants and Regional Aggregators. A secondary 
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effect of the aging process is that it redistributes participants among Regional Aggregators to 
rebalance their loads, although this load balancing process is admittedly naïve. 
The WAN IP is simply the WAN IPv4 address from which the participant successfully 
connected to the Regional Aggregator. Although we track the WAN IP address of participants, 
the Participant ID and Session Key are the primary fields used to identify registered participants. 
It is possible for multiple participants to use the same WAN IP address, as may be the case in a 
large organization containing multiple participants that use PAT or NAT to access resources 
outside the organization’s network. When a Regional Aggregator experiences misbehavior from 
a WAN IP address whose communication is not encrypted with a Partipant ID’s corresponding 
Session Key, it is assumed that the misbehavior is being caused by a non-participant. Such 
misbehavior may take the form of a SYN flood or similar misbehavior such as the host beginning 
a TCP 3-way handshake with the Regional Aggregator by sending a SYN and failing to respond to 
the Regional Aggregator’s SYN-ACK. An important benefit of this approach is that participants 
with active connections to the Regional Aggregator are not punished by misbehavior from hosts 
spoofing their source IP address. 
The Session Key is a 256 bit symmetric encryption key generated by the participant and 
agreed upon by both the participant and Regional Aggregator during session establishment. The 
session establishment and key generation processes are described in more detail below in 
Section 3.3.1.3 and in our discussion of Sensors below in Section 3.3.3. The session key is used 
by the Regional Aggregator to encrypt communications sent to the participant such as 
ephemeral blacklist updates, and from the participant to encrypt communications such as 
security incident data sent to the Regional Aggregator. Despite the use of cryptography, we are 
not particularly interested in preventing eavesdroppers from learning the content of messages 
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sent from the Regional Aggregator to participants. Rather, we use cryptography to reduce the 
risk of a third party intercepting and tampering with these messages, possibly causing 
participants to block hosts that were not originally included in ephemeral blacklist updates from 
the Regional Aggregator. Encrypting communications to the Regional Aggregator also reduces 
the risk that a malicious host would join the CODON and re-transmit information recently sent 
by another participant to more quickly or heavily penalize hosts reported by the innocent 
participant. 
3.3.1.2 Communication Among Regional Aggregators and Repositories 
Regional Aggregators must communicate with one another regularly to share security 
incident information and ephemeral blacklist data generated during each update cycle. An 
update cycle occurs every five minutes, and Regional Aggregators send an Activity Change Set 
detailing activity that occurred during the past update cycle to fellow Regional Aggregators using 
a peer-to-peer distributed hash table (DHT) algorithm such as Chord [67]. Activity Change Sets, 
of which we provide an example in Table 3.4, are marked with the same 4 byte Type ID that is 
used for managing ephemeral blacklists as already detailed in Section 3.1. Other maintenance 
tasks related to keeping security incident information up to date are performed at the end of 
each update cycle, such as expiring stale Sensor reporting history, updating participant Age and 
Cool Down Periods in the participant state database, and consolidating consecutive IP addresses 
into CIDR subnets in ephemeral blacklists. A Regional Aggregator may choose to “subscribe” to 
certain Type IDs and must use the information it receives from other Regional Aggregators to 
update its own ephemeral blacklists corresponding to those Type IDs. However, all Regional 
Aggregators must accept security information received from Sensors corresponding to other 
Type IDs and relay those messages to subscribing Regional Aggregators through the overlay 
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network. We believe it is neither feasible nor likely that all Regional Aggregators will always 
have a complete and consistent view of all security data shared in the CODON as the CODON 
scales due to transient issues like connectivity failures and churn among Regional Aggregators. 
Once per hour, after sharing Activity Change Sets, all Regional Aggregators must share and 
merge their ephemeral blacklists to reach a consistent understanding of ongoing malicious 
activity. This hourly update is then shared with Repositories for further distribution as discussed 
in Section 3.3.2. 
Table 3.4 An example Activity Change Set distributed by a Regional Aggregator during shutdown 
(Metadata): Activity Change Set Type ID 0x0002, “Port scanning, 100 ports in < 5 seconds” 
(Metadata): Source Regional Aggregator Participant ID 3bc27d1c-5bd5-4bd8-a367-acdcb435aa13 
Offender IP Offense last reported (UTC) Offense count by unique Sensors 
10.1.0.8 2014-01-01 11:01:00 1 
10.13.0.3 2014-01-01 11:02:15 2 
10.33.7.57 2014-01-01 11:04:23 5 
 
When a Regional Aggregator initializes, it generates a self-signed 4096 bit RSA key pair 
and publishes its own Participant ID, WAN IP, and public key to all Repositories that it can locate. 
The CODON software package should include an initial seed list of Repositories to allow Regional 
Aggregators to quickly enter service without the need to manually locate a Repository. 
Whenever a Repository requests ephemeral blacklist data from a Regional Aggregator, the 
Regional Aggregator will provide its most recently merged complete ephemeral blacklist 
corresponding to the Type ID(s) requested by the Repository. In addition to ephemeral blacklist 
data, the Regional Aggregator will provide the requesting Repository with a list of all its known 
peers in the Regional Aggregator overlay network including the corresponding Participant IDs, 
WAN IPs, and public keys. When a Regional Aggregator begins the process of shutting down, e.g. 
for scheduled system maintenance or because its maximum age has been reached, it will 
attempt to quickly distribute an Activity Change Set to its peers in the Regional Aggregator 
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overlay network before performing the usual participant_leave process described in 
Section 3.3.1.3. Regional Aggregators that have announced their departure to the overlay 
network or have been unresponsive for three consecutive update cycles are included in the peer 
list provided to Repositories but flagged for removal.  Repositories may request an updated 
Regional Aggregator peer list only twice per hour to limit resource usage, and will use the peer 
list to aid in directing new participants to Regional Aggregators. If a Repository is unable to 
contact a Regional Aggregator in two consecutive attempts, it will consider the Regional 
Aggregator dead and select a new Regional Aggregator from which to request updates. 
3.3.1.3 Participant Session Management 
We will now discuss session management between Regional Aggregators and other 
participants. The three major session management processes, described in more detail below, 
are: participant_join, participant_leave, and participant_rejoin. 
In the participant_join process illustrated below in Figure 3.3, if the participant is 
new to the CODON it locates a Regional Aggregator with whom to register by contacting a well-
known Repository over HTTP. A partial list of Repositories should be included with the CODON 
software installation package to make this process as simple for the end user as possible. If the 
participant has previously participated in the CODON, it will attempt to connect to a Regional 
Aggregator included in its most recent seed list of Regional Aggregators, and if unsuccessful fall 
back to contacting a Repository. The Repository generates a seed list of up to five Regional 
Aggregators that appear to be near the participant, along with each of those Regional 
Aggregators’ corresponding public RSA keys previously published to the Repository. These 
Regional Aggregators may be chosen based on an AS number lookup, IP-based geolocation, 
anycast [1] DNS address resolution, or another method the Repository may wish to employ, but 
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a reasonable effort should be made to avoid always providing the same one or two Regional 
Aggregators to the same participant. 
Having received a list of Regional Aggregators with which it may register, the participant 
attempts to register itself with a Regional Aggregator by encrypting a participant_join 
request using the Regional Aggregator’s public RSA key and sending the request to the Regional 
Aggregator. The participant_join request consists of a 256 bit Session Key randomly 
generated by the participant and the participant’s current system time as described above in 
Section 3.3.1.1. The Regional Aggregator will accept any 256 bit Session Key except an 
empty/null key. If the participant is not accepted by the Regional Aggregator due to resource 
constraints, imminent shutdown, or unacceptable clock skew as mentioned in Section 3.3.1.1, 
the Regional Aggregator will reply with the plaintext ASCII string CODON-NAK-BUSY, CODON-
NAK-DOWN, or CODON-NAK-TIME, respectively, causing the participant to restart the 
registration process with a new Regional Aggregator. If the participant is accepted by the 
Regional Aggregator, the Regional Aggregator will send an acknowledgement containing the 
participant’s newly generated Participant ID and a seed list of participants from its participant 
state database to serve as peers in the participant overlay network, all encrypted using the 
Session Key. If the participant is rejected twice due to clock skew, the participant’s CODON 















Session Key + 


























Figure 3.3 This flow diagram illustrates the steps a participant takes when attempting to join a CODON. 
The participant_leave process provides a means for participants to gracefully leave 
the CODON and reduce the amount of state maintained by the most recent Regional Aggregator 
with which it established a session. When the participant’s codonsense software service, 
described in Section 3.3.3, receives a graceful shutdown command from the operating system or 
administrator, it immediately discards any pending ISMs. The participant then notifies its 
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neighbors on the Sensor overlay network and its Regional Aggregator that it is shutting down by 
sending a participant_leave message. Neighboring Sensors will cease sharing or 
downloading any ephemeral blacklists from the departing Sensor and find a replacement 
neighbor on the overlay network if needed. Upon receipt of the participant_leave 
message, the Regional Aggregator immediately sets the participant’s Age to the maximum value, 
thereby queuing the participant for deletion from the participant state database at the end of 
the update cycle along with any other departing or expiring participants. A clean departure from 
the CODON is not strictly necessary due to our use of participant aging and the implementation 
of peer-to-peer communication for distributing aggregated security related data. Nevertheless, 
a successful participant_leave reduces the resource burden on Regional Aggregators and 
reduces the time new participants may spend trying to locate peers on the overlay network 
because Regional Aggregators will no longer include the departed participant in seed lists. To 
ensure a quick shutdown, the Regional Aggregator will not send an acknowledgement, nor will 
the departing participant’s codonsense service await one before terminating. 
In the participant_rejoin process, the Regional Aggregator informs the participant 
that the maximum session age has been reached, causing the participant to invoke the 
participant_join process anew and the Regional Aggregator to purge the participant from 
its participant state database. This process is very similar to participant_leave, with the key 
differences being that the Regional Aggregator initiates the participant_rejoin process and 
rather than shutting down and discarding any queued ISMs, the participant’s codonsense 
service continues monitoring and temporarily defers sending ISMs to a Regional Aggregator until 
the subsequent participant_join process is complete. Since the old state is purged from the 
Regional Aggregator’s participant state database, participants that do not honor the 
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participant_rejoin process are penalized during subsequent update cycles as they attempt 
to communicate with the Regional Aggregator using their old Participant Session Key and 
Participant ID. 
3.3.2 Repository 
The purpose of the CODON Repository role is to provide useful security threat 
information to non-participants and to reduce the computational and network load on 
participants during the blacklist import and export process. As discussed earlier and previously 
illustrated in Figure 3.1, Regional Aggregators receive their initial seed blacklists from 
Repositories. Repositories also keep track of active Regional Aggregators, their Participant IDs, 
their public RSA keys, and Type ID subscriptions. This helps new participants locate a Regional 
Aggregator and helps Regional Aggregators locate peers in the Regional Aggregator overlay 
network and determine where to forward incoming ISMs for Type IDs to which they do not 
subscribe. Repositories act as the intermediary between Regional Aggregators and non-
participant blacklist managers and consumers when threat information is determined by 
Regional Aggregators to be worth sharing during their hourly merge and update cycle. 
A concise visual guide to the flow of information to and from Repositories follows in 
Figure 3.4. Repository content such as blacklists will likely change frequently and some non-
participants may wish to directly check for updates from a CODON Repository instead of waiting 
for non-participant Security Information Aggregators to further refine and incorporate the new 
information supplied by the CODON. Repositories will publish hashes of the security data 
generated by the CODON, and may also transform the data into one or more formats 
appropriate to the systems that would make use of the information. Hashing the security data 
provides a means for new participants and non-participants to verify that the blacklist was 
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downloaded without being tampered or corrupted in transit, but we urge the use of well-
established secure file transfer protocols such as HTTPS and SFTP whenever possible to provide 
additional assurance to the blacklist consumer that the hash and blacklist data were not both 
tampered (please refer to Section 2.2 for further discussion of this problem). 
While a participant may serve as both a Regional Aggregator and a Repository, we 
believe separating these roles will allow participants who already manage internet-facing web 
servers to participate without the additional computational and network resources required to 
perform the duties of a Regional Aggregator. As published blacklist content is relatively static, 
i.e., it need not be stored in a database or generated and served via a dynamic script, 
lightweight web server software such as lighttpd [35] may be used to service blacklist requests, 
and common low-cost DNS-based load-balancing methods such as round-robin, geographic 
server distribution, and anycast [1] may be used to further reduce the burden of participating as 
a Repository. Repositories may also wish to redistribute additional security-related data not 
generated by the CODON such as attack signatures for use by an IDPS, antimalware definition 







































Figure 3.4 Information sharing between a Repository, CODON participants, and non-participants. 
3.3.3 Sensor 
Because we believe information sharing is a key component of cooperative defense, 
every participant of the CODON is a sensor. Sensors are responsible for sharing information with 
neighbors and repositories to allow for rapid collection and dissemination of intelligence about 
threats and ongoing attacks, underlying and overlay network health and topology changes, and 
recent noteworthy behaviors by fellow participants. Sensors may also subscribe to ephemeral 
blacklist updates and incorporate the blacklists into their system configuration for their 
protection. Since all participants are Sensors, each participant can potentially contribute to the 
health of the CODON and the internet at large when malicious activity is detected. 
The duties of a Sensor can be subdivided into two software services: codonsense and 
codonblock, illustrated below in Figure 3.5. The codonsense service is responsible for Sensor-to-
Regional Aggregator session management and for gathering recent security incident data from 
any available security data sources. These recent data are then reported to the Sensor’s 
corresponding Regional Aggregator by codonsense. Historical data with a timestamp older than 
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two update cycles (ten minutes) is to be completely disregarded since Regional Aggregators only 
consider newer incidents when updating their ephemeral blacklists. Data transformation plugins 
will be necessary to ensure that codonsense can parse and convert the data from various data 
sources for use in the CODON. The transformation plugins should be distributed with the Sensor 
software package for ease of use. 
The codonblock service is an optional service responsible for applying ephemeral 
blacklists to the Sensor’s security systems. We anticipate that home users with the codonblock 
service enabled may wish to apply all new ephemeral blacklist entries to their systems 
immediately. In contrast, participants with larger and more complex networks may wish only to 
apply blacklist updates at certain times throughout the day due to organizational change 
management policies. Participants may also wish to use different thresholds for determining 
whether to block access based on an ephemeral blacklist entry. For example, a participant 
mainly interested in safe web browsing may wish for all entries in an ephemeral blacklist to 
apply immediately, whereas a participant whose primary concern is malicious systems 
attempting to compromise an e-commerce web server may wish to be more conservative to 
avoid losing potential customers. The latter participant may choose only to block access to the 
web server if an entry has an expiration of at least 24 hours, implying that the host or network in 
the blacklist entry was reported as malicious by multiple Sensors over a period of time. 
Any security-related data source may be used as a source of security incident data to be 
monitored and shared by the CODON Sensor software with the use of an appropriate data 
source parser. While the Sensor software should be able to gather security incident data from 
hardware firewall logs and other common devices via standardized and common methods like 
SNMP (Simple Network Management Protocol) and a syslog listener, locally generated and 
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stored logs in the form of plaintext files or operating system specific log formats may also be 
leveraged via a custom data source parser. Custom data source parsers can be useful for 
extracting security-related information from proprietary software that may not use common or 
standard logging formats. Custom data source parsers should be vetted for correctness by 
technically skilled participants in the CODON community and distributed with the CODON 
software for the benefit of future participants when possible. 
The use of an IDPS, enterprise-grade firewall, or other advanced security software can 
undoubtedly provide useful security incident information for the CODON, but it is not necessary 
for participation as a Sensor. Home networks with ISP-provided multifunction modems and 
router/firewall devices as well as host-based firewalls will likely provide the majority of data 
reported to Regional Aggregators. Most modern home computer operating systems include 
host-based firewalls, and these firewalls are usually enabled by default. Host-based firewalls 
include the ubiquitous netfilter [6] included with mainstream Linux distributions, the 
eponymous Windows Firewall included with Microsoft Windows client and server operating 
systems, and various third-party firewall software systems that can be purchased and/or 
downloaded over the Internet. 
Most Sensors will only be able to report passively observed security incident 
information on a small scale, but some Sensors have unique resources enabling them to 
passively detect larger scale events or proactively detect security issues with other systems. We 
refer to the latter category of Sensors as “Active Detectors.” Large scale passive detection 
capabilities are usually limited to participants with unique resources or unique topographical 
placement on the internet, such as internet service providers, transit providers, and CDNs, but 
also include research projects like the UCSD Network Telescope [14] and University of Oregon’s 
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Route Views [70] project. Active Detectors may offer network perimeter vulnerability scanning 
services [69] and/or auditing and validation of security best practices. Since Active Detectors 
engage in activity that may be considered malicious or suspicious in the course of their 
operations, they must register with a Defensive Service Broker (described in Section 3.3.4) 
before engaging in active detection functions like port scanning to ensure they are not 
blacklisted. To ensure that security incident reports from a Sensor with large scale passive 
detection capabilities is given a proportionate level of credibility, the Sensor’s administrator may 
choose a unique Type ID and encourage other participants to give the corresponding ephemeral 
blacklist a greater weight as described in Section 3.4. 
Reporting security incidents such as local virus infections or successful intrusions is 
encouraged as the information can be very valuable to the CODON, helping research 
organizations and the CODON itself identify emerging threats and attacks. However, sharing 
information about one’s own system or network can introduce a risk of attack by traitorous 
participants and outsiders, so by default Sensors only share information about external-to-
internal network based security incidents. Furthermore, when a Sensor reports a security 
incident to a Regional Aggregator, the default behavior is for the Sensor to omit the specific 
destination/victim IP and any private IP address ranges to avoid divulging information about the 
Sensor’s local network, leaving the Regional Aggregator to assume that the Sensor’s WAN IP 
address was the destination. Our use of session encryption also helps ensure that only Regional 
Aggregators, not participants serving solely as Sensors, receive the sensitive details of an attack. 
We believe this behavior strikes a reasonable balance for most participants between providing 
credible threat information while preserving participant privacy, but Sensors will likely choose 
only to omit private IP range information. For example, a Sensor may use an intrusion detection 
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system to monitor a variety of hosts with one or more WAN IPs on its network, and providing 
the attack destination IPs will present a clearer picture of the scope of a distributed attack by 
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Figure 3.5 A home user (left) and a web hosting provider (right) particiate as Sensors with the optional 
codonblock service enabled. Any available source of security data may be monitored by the codonsense 
service. 
3.3.4 Defensive Service Broker 
It is often desirable to assess one’s own network’s security by performing an external 
test from another network. This offers the administrator an outsider’s perspective of the 
network and may reveal security issues that are difficult to discern internally. Defensive Service 
Brokers, or simply “Brokers,” serve as matchmakers for participants seeking proactive detection 
services and other parties offering such services including periodic vulnerability scanning and 
one-time or recurring intensive security assessments such as penetration tests. Such network 
security activities are classified as malicious when unsolicited, so it is necessary to provide a 
mechanism by which security service providers can continue contributing to fellow participants’ 
security using their unique resources without being blacklisted. 
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While a participant could simply ask a neighboring CODON participant to externally 
assess the security of its network, we expect the majority of participants to lack proactive 
detection abilities. Legal contracts are often used to set parameters and boundaries for 
penetration testing, as security assessments performed by third parties require a level of trust 
to be established between the tester and the requesting party. Security service providers may 
also wish to perform their activities from non-participant networks and systems to better 
simulate real-world security threats. Brokers notify repositories in advance of the agreed-upon 
but potentially suspicious activity based on specific source and destination IP address ranges 
and the type of behavior agreed upon by the service provider and requesting party. 
Service requesters and service providers such as Active Detectors register requests and 
proactive security offers with a Broker via ISMs, and when a Broker finds a match that would 
satisfy both parties’ criteria, the Broker notifies both parties, who acknowledge and agree to the 
match. Both parties must agree before the matchmaking opportunity expires. The Broker then 
notifies Regional Aggregators of the upcoming activity along with a time window indicating 
when the activity is expected to take place. Based on this information, Regional Aggregators will 
ignore any reports of suspicious activity between the participants during specific time windows. 
The applicable time window will be updated if the service request is completed early. If a match 
is successful, the service provider may earn reputation with the participant or multiple 
participants. If a match is unsuccessful because the service provider exceeded the time window 
or failed to complete the requested service, that party’s reputation suffers as participants send 
ISMs with the appropriate Type ID to their Regional Aggregators noting the activity (or inactivity, 
as the case may be). 
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 Information Sharing Messages and Scoring 3.4
The sharing of security incident information from Sensors to Regional Aggregators 
occurs via Information Sharing Messages (ISMs). ISMs are simply encrypted messages containing 
the sender’s Participant ID and incident information in a common format appropriate to the 
message’s subject matter. For example, an ISM regarding an excessive number of unsuccessful 
attempts to log into a website in a short period of time might include the CODON participant’s 
Participant ID, the Type ID of the blacklist corresponding to the type of attack, the source IP of 
the attack, the destination port of the attack, and the time the attack was logged or blocked by 
the participant’s system. The Type ID encapsulated in the ISM is essential for a Regional 
Aggregator to determine whether it should consider the ISM when updating an ephemeral 
blacklist that it manages, or if it should instead pass the ISM to other interested Regional 
Aggregators in its overlay network. As discussed above in Section 3.3.1.3, encrypting ISMs is 
done primarily for non-repudiation and to reduce the threat of eavesdroppers deceiving other 





























Figure 3.6 A Sensor sends an Information Sharing Message (ISM) to its Regional Aggregator. 
3.4.1 Evaluating the Costs of Different Threats 
It is difficult to quantify the costs and benefits of network defense and health activity, 
but we have chosen three useful evaluation criteria when considering how one might participate 
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in a CODON, as well as how one might respond to actions that occur during the course of 
CODON participation. To respect the heterogeneity and differing priorities of a CODON, these 
criteria can be weighted by individual participants based on what they deem to be important. 
The criteria we have selected are monetary cost change     , network health / defensive 
posture change     , and reputation change     . While the goal of most participants will be 
maximizing    while minimizing    with a side effect of increasing   , participants with more 
resources to contribute to the CODON will likely seek to maximize    through spending money 
     to increase    and as a side effect garner more public attention, potential customers, 
research funding, etc. 
While all CODON participants are required to accept and propagate new security 
incident information with fellow participants in the peer-to-peer overlay network, each 
participant may choose to “subscribe” to particular incident Type IDs via the codonblock service. 
This allows the participant to apply weights to each incident of a particular type and use this 
weight information to maintain a local blacklist with expiration durations tailored to the 
participant’s desires. This may be useful for large web server farms that only wish to block 
compromised home users for a brief time or serve a custom webpage directing the same users 
to a non-participant Remediator. On the other hand, many home users and corporate network 
administrators may wish to begin blocking websites that distribute malware as soon as they are 
reported instead of waiting for a large number of corroborating reports from other CODON 
participants. 
3.4.2 Assigning Scores to Consequences 
Actions by CODON participants have consequences, and in our model these 
consequences take the form of a three-tuple            where each element of the tuple 
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corresponds to the aforementioned evaluation criteria of monetary cost change, network 
health/defensive posture change, and reputation change. Default consequence scores are 
assigned to behavior classes as described in Section 3.4.4, and are to be maintained and 
distributed with the CODON software. Each element of the consequence tuple may range 
from -100 to 100. Participants convert consequence to single values for each behavior class 
based on how strongly the participant feels about the behavior. The resulting single value score 
can be used to determine trends in individual participants’ behavior, how valuable a certain 
participant’s participation may be, or whether to adjust ephemeral blacklist expirations to 
better meet the participant’s desires. Public relations departments in large organizations may 
wish to use this scoring system to advertise their benevolence in year-end charitable activity 
reports, and small organizations and home users may likewise wish to advertise their 
benevolence for competitive or reputational benefit on social media networks. Similarly, 
Repositories and non-participant researchers may perform statistical and historical analysis of 
the volume and quality of CODON contributions compared to other research efforts to evaluate 
the effectiveness of the CODON and refine their own blacklist criteria. 
3.4.3 Actor Classification 
CODON participants and non-participants can be classified based on historical behavior. 
We will refer to both participants and non-participants in general as “actors” when discussing 
classification. A CODON by its nature is best served when all participants consistently classify a 
particular actor as having the same actor class, and therefore interact with that actor 
accordingly. Nevertheless, an individual participant may choose to classify a particular actor 
differently due to recent events not yet communicated throughout the CODON or due to 
circumstances only relevant to that individual participant. It is also possible that actors who 
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consistently engage in friendly behavior may be treated with distrust by other actors due to 
ideological or geopolitical differences. Table 3.5 lists actor classes in this model and their 
defining characteristics and behaviors. 
Table 3.5 CODON actor classifications 
Actor Class Participant? Defining Characteristics and Historical Behaviors 
Good 
Neighbor 
Yes Has a history of positive actions/contributions in the CODON. 
Protectorate Yes Has only the Sensor role and a short (or no) history of actions/contributions 
in the CODON. 
Pariah Yes Participant with a history of predominantly negative actions. A “three 
strikes” rule or negative value reputation threshold may be employed to 
differentiate pariahs from participants that are experiencing a temporary 
crisis. 
Offender No Has a history of predominantly negative actions as evidenced by inclusion 
in one or more blacklists. 
 
3.4.4 Behavior Classes and Evaluation Criteria for Scoring 
Both friendly and unfriendly actions are worth considering when evaluating how an 
actor should be classified and what an appropriate response should be for different CODON 
participants. Actions of interest to participants may be divided into several behavior classes. 
Table 3.6 lists these behavior classes along with corresponding example behaviors and some 
possible default consequence scores as discussed in Section 3.4.2.  
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Table 3.6 Behavior classes and scoring of CODON participant actions 
Behavior Class Example(s)          
Detection Vulnerability scanning; firewall and IDPS log aggregation and 
sharing; network monitoring for malicious traffic flows; monitoring 
sudden internet topology changes 
15 20 10 
Unsolicited 
Reconnaissance 
Performing active detection functions without first agreeing via a 
Broker; failing to perform Brokered services 
-10 -25 -25 
Information 
Propagation 
Successfully and consistently sharing ISMs and ephemeral blacklists 
via the peer-to-peer overlay network; participating as a Repository 
5 5 5 
Withholding 
Information 
Not sharing ephemeral blacklists via the overlay network, e.g. being 
blocked by egress firewall filtering, CODON software malfunctioning 
-5 -10 -5 
Incident Self-
Reporting 
Sharing detailed IODEF [16] incident reports about malware 
outbreaks in one’s own network via ISMs; sharing incident reports 
about attempted attacks 
10 30 25 
Remediation 
Provision 
Hosting software patch repositories (Linux distribution mirrors, etc.); 
Common Remediation Enumeration (CRE [42]) repository publishing 
30 30 25 
Remediation 
Implementation 
Software patch or anti-malware definition development; CRE 
creation; updating blacklists; malicious network classification; 
throttling attack traffic 
30 30 30 
Malicious 
Activity 
Participating in a DDoS; sending spam or phishing email; appearing 
on a blacklist 
-40 -40 -40 
 
3.4.5 Scoring and Weighting Example 
Consider a home user who is scanned for vulnerabilities by another participant having 
not first agreed to the scan via a Defensive Service Broker, and a small web hosting service in 
the same circumstance. Consequences are weighted and scored using the following formula: 
   
                 
        
 
Suppose the home user finds the default consequence scores to be adequate and 
weighs all consequence elements equally using CODON’s default weight of            
        but the small web hosting service thinks monetary cost is twice as important as the 
other evaluation criteria and thus adjusts all consequences using a weight of            
       . Using the scoring formula above and the default unsolicited reconnaissance 
consequence of              , the home user would score this behavior as  , but the web 
host would score it as     . If the unsolicited scanning activity were to continue, the web host 
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would locally blacklist the offender via the codonblock service sooner and for a longer duration 
than the home user and other participants might. 
 Potential for CODON Abuse 3.5
A malicious actor may foreseeably use a botnet to install a tampered version of the 
CODON software to falsely report a victim as being malicious and undermine the CODON’s 
trustworthiness. The use of information expiration, or the “ephemeral” in ephemeral blacklists, 
helps ensure that if an attempt to poison the quality of information generated by the CODON is 
successful, the attack’s effectiveness will be limited. Smaller scale attempts to falsely report a 
victim are unlikely to succeed due to the requirement that multiple Sensors must report 
malicious activity in a short period of time for the threat to be considered credible. Weighting 
particular threats and blacklists by Type ID can further mitigate the botnet threat, but a whitelist 
may be more appropriate to override blacklist settings. For example, it may be beneficial to 
whitelist well-known e-commerce websites and non-participant Security Information 
Aggregators and Remediators. Whitelisting may leave participants vulnerable if one of the 
whitelisted hosts are compromised, and whitelists can be very burdensome to manage as we 
discussed in Section 2.10, particularly when many organizations use third-party CDNs or own 
multiple discontiguous blocks of IP addresses across multiple ASes that could change frequently. 
While we have proposed a numerical scoring system for actions based on their 
perceived friendliness, we admit that no scoring system will perfectly reflect the complex and 
dynamic nature of cross-organizational relationships, and most home users may find the 
weighting mechanism confusing. When a fellow CODON participant behaves in such a way that 
merits a classification change, we believe particularly with larger organizations that CODON-
generated intelligence should be used as part of the human decision making process, not as a 
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substitute. Periods of attacks from another participant’s network may not always justify 
blacklisting that participant from the CODON and reclassifying the participant as an offender. 
 Barriers to Adoption and Some Watershed Moments 3.6
With a distributed system on the scale of the internet, widespread infrastructure 
changes seldom occur quickly; one needs only consider IPv6, the long-awaited successor to IPv4. 
Among other benefits, IPv6 uses 128 bit IP addresses compared to the 32 bit addresses used in 
IPv4. Excluding reserved blocks of private addresses,      addresses can be used in IPv6, 
whereas only     can be represented in IPv4. Despite the long-predicted and impending 
depletion of available IPv4 addresses, administrators have gone to great lengths to avoid costly 
upgrades and learning a new and complex system. This is despite the existence of early IPv6 
implementations in the mid-to-late-1990s [33] and its inclusion in all modern operating systems, 
although adoption has increased significantly in the past two to three years through the efforts 
of a consortium of major hardware, software, and service vendors [34]. Port address translation 
(PAT), often mistaken for and commonly referred to network address translation (NAT), allows 
multiple privately-addressed IPs to communicate through a single public IP address. This serves 
as a cheap and ubiquitous stopgap solution to the problem of dwindling publicly addressable IP 
addresses and creates added layers of configuration complexity and security as privately-
addressed hosts can easily initiate communication to publicly-addressed hosts, but the reverse 
is difficult. For infrastructure providers, cost and profit tend to be primary drivers for major 
upgrades, but for home users the usefulness or “wow factor” of a service tend to drive 
upgrades. Considering the rise and trends of mobile computing over the past several years, 
particularly the shift of smartphones from business users to casual/novice internet users, we 
believe tailoring the CODON software toward less technical end-users will have the greatest 
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probability success. As home users experience the benefit of a safer internet and share this 
experience with their real and virtual communities, larger organizations will be attracted to this 
momentum and participate in the more resource intensive CODON roles of Regional Aggregator 
and Repository. With greater participation from larger organizations, we expect the CODON 
architecture to undergo refinement and optimization, evolving to better serve the internet 
community. 
There are also cultural and political barriers that may affect the growth and adoption of 
CODONs. Culturally speaking, many technical users may resist sharing what they consider 
private metadata about their network, especially in light of recent revelations about state-
sponsored metadata gathering and domestic spying. The open source spirit of the CODON 
framework should help allay those fears to some degree, as technical users can review and 
verify the CODON software’s behavior. Furthermore, the CODON’s emphasis is on detection of 
malicious and suspicious security-related behavior from other internet users, not one’s own web 
browsing or other communication habits. Politically speaking, some nations and organizations 
ban the use of strong encryption, or prohibit its use between internal networks and external 
networks to enforce censorship policies or defend against sensitive data exfiltration. Such 
nations may wish to modify the CODON software and operate their own CODONs that comply 
with political requirements. While we consider the prohibition of encryption and the existence 
of censorship deeply regrettable, the existence of a small number of politically-driven CODONs 
may still contribute to improving security for the internet community as a whole. 
Regional Aggregators and Repositories are responsible for managing and sharing 
numerous blacklists based on varying criteria via Type IDs, and the resource commitment for 
these participants may be significant, especially as a CODON grows. We do not believe this to be 
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a significant barrier in light of the proliferation of ever-scaling high performance and commodity 
“cloud computing” services provided by Amazon, Microsoft, and others. We do not believe 
resource utilization by home users will pose a barrier to CODON participation, as projects such 
as Stanford University’s Folding@home [52], virtual currency systems based on computing 
meaningless hashes like Bitcoin [8], and BitTorrent-based file sharing are widely used even 
among less technically adept members of the internet community despite their significant 
resource requirements. 
We see a great opportunity to spur CODON participation through the cooperation of 
internet service providers and consumer-grade network security appliances. Several consumer 
firewall hardware manufacturers have in recent years built upon the efforts of open source 
custom firmware developers to inexpensively include more features in their equipment and 
appeal to enthusiasts, and ISPs commonly include a software CD and free or subsidized 
subscriptions to antimalware software for new customers. By including CODON Sensor software 
in consumer-grade security devices and ISP customer software bundles, these manufacturers 
and ISPs could significantly expand the number of Sensors participating in the CODON. Using the 
incentive and consequence scoring paradigm we detailed throughout Section 3.4, 
manufacturers may see an improvement in reputation and ISPs may see an improvement in 
both reputation and network health/defensive posture as their customers’ systems are less 
frequently compromised. Home computer manufacturers could further promulgate the CODON 
Sensor software through the common practice of pre-installing the software at the factory. 
With its heavy bent toward open source, the CODON may initially take greater hold 
among the Linux community than among proprietary operating system users. As such, designing 
the CODON Sensor software as a signal-aware daemon, to use kernel modules for performance 
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acceleration, or with methods to directly interface with specialized network hardware or the 
netfilter firewall [6] may build momentum among Linux home users, developers, and enterprise 
system administrators by encouraging various Linux distribution maintainers to include the 




We have described a framework for developing and deploying a global crowdsourced 
defensive network to make automated network-based threat detection, information sharing, 
and defense accessible to the masses. As malicious actors continue to find innovative ways to 
wreak havoc against unsuspecting internet users on an unprecedented scale, the need for a 
more panoramic view of network-based threats is clear. It is also clear to us that cooperative 
defense strategies hold the most hope for effective defense against numerous cooperative 
aggressors. While large commercial organizations such as major software vendors stand to gain 
less defensive benefit from participation in a CODON than home end-users, their reputations are 
likely to improve as their customers and potential customers benefit from timely threat 
information sharing and a history of being a “good neighbor” in the wild and dangerous 
internet. We believe that even a low CODON participation rate can have a noticeable positive 
effect on the internet by providing quick and actionable intelligence to those system 
administrators with the unique resources and specialized tools necessary for mitigating 
distributed attacks. Even the formation of many small CODONs based on differing geopolitical, 
ideological, and commercial motivators would provide a benefit to the larger internet 
community as different “neighborhoods” of the internet become safer.  
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5 Future Work 
We would like to see a CODON come to fruition through the implementation of the 
various CODON roles in software and collaborative testing between the academic research, 
private research, and online enthusiast communities. And as we already discussed in Section 
3.6, building and optimizing the CODON software for inclusion and use in home firewall/router 
firmware would surely go a great way toward making the CODON dream a reality. The CODON 
software could be further refined to understand and comply with mandatory access controls 
and security policies on systems using SELinux [44] to provide further assurance to system 
administrators that sensitive internal data will not inadvertently be shared with the larger 
CODON community. We provide a list of milestones that should take place to bring CODON from 
concept to successful widespread usage in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Major milestones in the process of taking CODON from concept to widespread adoption. 
Milestone Description 
M1 CODON roles implemented in software using cross-platform languages and libraries with 
minimal set of data transformation plugins. 
M2 CODON successfully tested using multiple internet-facing hosts within the same 
organization. 
M3 CODON successfully tested using multiple internet-facing systems across multiple 
academic/research organizations, adding data transformation plugins to interface with 
participants’ security systems. 
M4 CODON registered as a new project at a publicly accessible open-source project repository, 
made available for common operating systems. 
M5 Research and enthusiast communities adopt CODON, contributing and testing useful data 
transformation plugins. 
M6 CODON earns reputation as a useful and mature security system. 
M7 CODON software included by default in Linux distributions and incorporated into ISP-
provided router firmware. 
 
While we believe a publicly accessible CODON will benefit the largest segment of the 
internet, we also acknowledge that governments, regulatory agencies, sensitive research labs, 
and other entities with special requirements may wish to employ a federated approach whereby 
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only select participants may participate, let alone fill certain roles. Such entities may also wish to 
integrate existing authentication and authorization systems, or even collect administrative fees 
from participants to pay for dedicated administrators and security data analysts to clean more 
insightful information than strictly blacklists from their more selective CODONs. The CODON 
framework could be extended to incorporate federated participation and authentication. 
The CODON framework as we have described it does not explicitly support IPv6. This 
was done for the sake of simplicity and because as we alluded to in Section 3.6, IPv6 still faces 
an uphill battle for full adoption and remains unfamiliar and confusing to many administrators. 
CODON could be extended with some effort to incorporate IPv6 concepts such as site-local and 
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